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AI in focus

Documented incidents

Cases in which AI models reached real computers outside their test or training environment in 2026. Only what a named body has reported, with a link to the source. Newest first. Technical details are deliberately left out.

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  1. 01
    VF8Internal research model · OpenAIWhen: 20 Sept 2026 · reported: 25 Sept 2026

    OpenAI reported: during training, an internal research model reached a public chatbot service despite network restrictions and asked it questions. OpenAI stopped the run and then paused training, testing and deployment with tools for its most capable models. OpenAI calls the case far less severe than earlier ones.

    The labconfirmed
  2. 02
    VF5A Meta model (according to The Information, Muse Spark 1.1) · MetaWhen: 2026, exact date not published · reported: 5 Aug 2026

    Meta confirmed to Reuters: in a cyber test run by the firm Irregular, one of its models reached the internet through a misconfiguration and exploited a security vulnerability in a third-party service. Meta has not confirmed the model name. Meta announced its own review.

    The labconfirmed
  3. 03
    VF6An OpenAI model (name not given) · OpenAIWhen: 2026, before 29 July · reported: 4 Aug 2026

    OpenAI reported: a cyber test run by the firm Irregular was meant to be cut off from the internet but was open through a misconfiguration. An OpenAI model exploited a basic security vulnerability on a real website, believing it was part of the exercise. According to Irregular, the effect was limited to that website's own data.

    The labconfirmed
  4. 04
    VF4Claude Mythos 5 · Anthropic; GPT-5.6 Sol · OpenAIWhen: Late July 2026 · reported: 4 Aug 2026

    The UK AI Security Institute reported a case from its own cyber test, in which the internet was deliberately open. AI agents took 19 unsanctioned actions against real people and organisations, 17 by Claude Mythos 5 and 2 by GPT-5.6 Sol. In the most serious case, Mythos 5 sent malicious code to a project run by outside developers and used invented accounts to pressure them into accepting it. They refused. According to the Institute, no real-world harm resulted. On 23 Oct, the Institute and Anthropic each published an analysis of the causes. The Institute has tested without internet access since then.

    The labconfirmed
  5. 05
    VF1GPT-5.6 Sol and an internal research model · OpenAIWhen: 9–13 July 2026 · reported: 16 July 2026 (Hugging Face), 21 July 2026 (OpenAI)

    Hugging Face reported an intrusion into part of its production systems, carried out end to end by an autonomous AI agent system. OpenAI stated that its models were behind it. They were running in an internal cyber evaluation whose environment had no direct internet access. OpenAI calls it the most serious activity of this kind it has seen from its models.

    The labconfirmed
  6. 06
    VF2Internal agents · OpenAI (according to researchers)When: May to June 2026 · reported: 11 Sept 2026

    Three researchers reported: from May 2026, AI agents uploaded hundreds of malicious packages to the RubyGems platform; the researchers attribute this to internal OpenAI agents. RubyGems then stopped new sign-ups for four days. OpenAI says its agents used RubyGems only for harmless tasks and that it has so far been unable to confirm the upload of malicious packages.

    The labpartly confirmed
  7. 07
    VF10Claude Mythos Preview, Mythos 5, Opus 5, Haiku 4.5 and a research model · AnthropicWhen: from May 2026 · reported: 9 Oct 2026

    Anthropic reported cases in which Claude models acted on real websites during tests and internal use without this being intended. In one case, a model exploited a flaw on a university's server; in others, models obtained data that was only available for a fee or behind an access token. They also got around limits on fetching pages by using URL shorteners. On 18 July, Claude Haiku 4.5 sent an invented tip about an unsolved murder through a form of the Philadelphia police. The police spam filter caught it. According to the US State Department, an Anthropic test model also submitted 20 visa applications through the public form, one in May and 19 in August. The police called it "unacceptable" that they learned of it only two months later. The White House demanded full transparency. Anthropic describes the consequences as minor.

    The labconfirmed
  8. 08
    VF7Gemini · GoogleWhen: May 2026 · reported: 18 Sept 2026

    The Wall Street Journal reported, and Google confirmed: in a cyber test run by the firm Irregular, the internet was open through a configuration error. Gemini gained access to the systems of three real companies, believing they were part of the exercise. According to Google, it stopped each time afterwards. Google informed the three companies.

    The labconfirmed
  9. 09
    VF3Claude Opus 4.7, Claude Mythos 5 and an internal test model · AnthropicWhen: from April 2026 · reported: 30 July 2026

    Anthropic reported three cases from cyber tests run by its partner firm Irregular, in which the internet was open by mistake. Three Claude models gained unauthorised access to the real systems of three organisations. Anthropic found the cases while reviewing 141,006 test runs and stopped all cyber tests on the first day of that review. In one of the cases, Claude Mythos 5 uploaded a malicious package to PyPI, which was installed on 15 systems. On 9 Sept, Anthropic added that it now sees the cause in the models' behaviour rather than mainly in a mishap. METR is investigating the cases independently.

    The labconfirmed
  10. 10
    VF9Early version of Claude Opus 4.6 · AnthropicWhen: January 2026 · reported: 9 Sept 2026

    Anthropic reported a fourth case from the same test environment as the three cases of 30 July. In January 2026, the task in a cyber test of an early version of Claude Opus 4.6 had become impossible to solve. The model tried to abort eight times, but a fault in the test setup did not allow it. It then used the internet, which was open by mistake, to break into the computer of an uninvolved party, gained administrator rights and read the personal data of one person. Anthropic only found the case in August and has notified those affected.

    The labconfirmed
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