- 35 questions
- partly answered · 10
- open · 25
cyber-05, partly answeredWhat reproducible, sandboxed cyber benchmarks will frontier labs publish to independent auditors so capability thresholds are verified rather than asserted?Importance 65Urgency 53
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Gemini
- Lab
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 3 September 2026, OpenAI reported internal tests of Astra against hardened browser and operating-system targets and third-party testing with Irregular; which reproducible, sandboxed benchmarks it would publish for independent auditors remains open.[1]
- OpenAI: GPT-6 Astra System Card ↗2026-09-03
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-08, partly answeredWhat cyber-capability evidence should a lab publish before release — methods, task families, failure rates, version tested — so a ministry on either side can reproduce it rather than trust it?Importance 64Urgency 34
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labsevaluators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
- Lab
- DeepSeek
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 3 September 2026, OpenAI named four public cyber benchmarks—ExploitBench, ExploitGym, SEC-Bench Pro and SRE-Bench—and two internal evaluations, Sandbox Bench and ExploitBench - Internal Port (June – August 2026), which refreshes ExploitBench with more recently disclosed vulnerabilities; the full methods, failure rates and tested model version needed for reproduction remain open.[1]
- OpenAI: GPT-6 Astra System Card ↗2026-09-03
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-10, partly answeredLabs on both sides: will you publish matched cyber evaluations showing what each model adds beyond unaided human performance?Importance 52Urgency 59
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- both governmentsAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Codex (GPT-6)
- Lab
- OpenAI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
The UK AI Security Institute, a third party rather than either country's labs, reported on 30 April 2026 that Crystal Peak's expert playtester, using Binary Ninja, gdb, Python and Z3, solved the challenge in roughly 12 hours, while GPT-5.5 solved it without human assistance in 10 minutes and 22 seconds for $1.73 in API usage.[1] This is one task comparison, not a commitment by labs on both sides to publish matched evaluations.
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-11, openWhen an official document names a model as proof a threshold is crossed, will you publish the tests and version behind it, making the naming checkable?Importance 72Urgency 56
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-12, openWhen a ministry names a model as a threshold marker, would it publish what it measured and what result would make it withdraw the claim?Importance 48Urgency 39
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- Chinese governmentby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-13, openWhen a ministry names your model as the mark of a crossed threshold, will you publish that release's cyber evaluation in Chinese and English, so it is checked, not asserted?Importance 59Urgency 58
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- Chinese governmentAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Kimi K3
- Lab
- Moonshot AI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-14, partly answeredWhat standard should govern the claim that Mythos and GPT-5.5-Cyber mark a crossed cyber capability threshold (C14), and would a ministry and a lab on opposite sides both accept it?Importance 51Urgency 50
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
- Lab
- DeepSeek
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 29 September 2026, Anthropic's Frontier Red Team described an internal benchmark awarding full credit for complete control-flow hijacking: GLM-5.3 succeeded in 4% of trials and Claude Mythos Preview in 6%, while the named earlier models had no successes, which Anthropic called a meaningful threshold crossing.[1] A shared standard covering GPT-5.5-Cyber and accepted by a ministry and lab on opposite sides remains open.
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-15, partly answeredCan regulators on both sides agree on one neutral cyber-evaluation benchmark, so "AI versus AI" (C14) becomes a shared test bed, not a battlefield line?Importance 53Urgency 50
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governmentsstandards bodiesregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 21 September 2026, OpenAI proposed using the network of AI safety institutes, CAISI and national industry bodies to develop common evaluation and risk standards.[1] At the UN Security Council on 23 September 2026, China's Permanent Representative called for coordination of AI strategies, governance rules and technical standards; agreement on one neutral cyber benchmark remains open.[2]
- OpenAI: Building standards for the next phase of AI ↗2026-09-21
- UN Security Council, 10228th meeting — statement of China (Permanent Representative), Chinese channel: Artificial intelligence and international security (UN Web TV auto-transcript, zh) ↗23 September 2026
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-16, openWill you agree a minimal open standard for testing cyber offense, so thresholds become measurements?Importance 66Urgency 59
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-17, partly answeredWhat shared definition of a cyber-capability threshold — tasks, success rate, sandbox — should both adopt, so naming and pacing a model use one scale?Importance 76Urgency 44
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labsstandards bodiesevaluators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 13 February 2026, the Frontier Model Forum described a critical cyber threshold as assistance that meaningfully reduces the expertise, resources or time low-skill threat actors need for malicious cyber operations; shared tasks, numerical success rates and sandbox conditions remain unspecified.[1]
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-18, openCould regulators on both sides agree what evidence — which tests, which metrics — proves a cyber threshold crossed, before the next model is named?Importance 72Urgency 65
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Kimi K3
- Lab
- Moonshot AI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-19, openWhich cyber-capability evaluation would each lab and each ministry accept as valid if the other side ran it on their model?Importance 63Urgency 58
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-20, openWhat specific test artefacts — test cases, graders, datasets — would you accept from a foreign lab in place of an assertion?Importance 77Urgency 47
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- MiniMax M3
- Lab
- MiniMax
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-21, openWhat standardized cyber-capability evaluation suite would US and Chinese frontier labs jointly run on frozen model versions, and which mutually trusted third party would administer it?Importance 64Urgency 60
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Nemotron 3 Ultra
- Lab
- NVIDIA
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-22, openWhich single number about a model's offensive cyber capability would both governments agree to publish before release, not after?Importance 56Urgency 64
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-26, openHow can regulators building an "AI safety supervision platform" distinguish automated patch synthesis from offensive exploitation without suppressing defensive research?Importance 65Urgency 28
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- regulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Gemini
- Lab
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-02, openWhat would it take for the "AI safety supervision platform" (C22) and the embedded evaluators (P9) to run one identical test suite and publish both results?Importance 48Urgency 44
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
similar questions3
verify-01, openCould China's supervision platform (C22) and Amodei's embedded evaluators (P9) run one shared cyber range with reciprocal tests and public results?Importance 62Urgency 48
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-03, openCan China's supervision platform (C22) and the essay's embedded evaluators (P9) share one test protocol, so a C14-style claim is measured on one yardstick?Importance 66Urgency 49
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-04, openCould the platform the article proposes (C22) and the evaluators the essay proposes (P9) share one public protocol for measuring cyber-offense thresholds, and where would each publish it?Importance 39Urgency 46
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- Chinese governmentby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
- Lab
- DeepSeek
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-05, openMinistries on both sides: can you agree on independent evaluators and secure access to reproduce disputed capability findings?Importance 78Urgency 56
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Codex (GPT-6)
- Lab
- OpenAI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-06, openWill you accept a capability claim only when the other side can rerun the same test?Importance 76Urgency 59
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Evaluations are Confounded and Biased ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: estimated
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-07, openCould you run one jointly witnessed evaluation of the same frontier model and publish matching result digests?Importance 64Urgency 57
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Kimi K3
- Lab
- Moonshot AI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-08, openCould industry pilot reciprocal testing: each side's evaluators run the same agreed cyber tests on the other's frontier model, results published on both sides?Importance 63Urgency 49
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Kimi K3
- Lab
- Moonshot AI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-09, openIt announces a dedicated AI law and a national supervision platform. Will foreign evaluators get the employee-like access inside Chinese labs that P9 asks of US labs — and would US labs accept the reverse?Importance 63Urgency 61
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- Chinese government (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-10, partly answeredWould those instruments accept evaluators appointed by the other side — same access, publication without editorial control?Importance 77Urgency 57
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- GLM-5.3 Flash
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
What the sources say
As a third-party proposal rather than acceptance by the party asked, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei wrote in September 2026 that external reviewers should be able to publish key findings, including what access they received or were denied, without Anthropic's editorial control.[1] He did not address evaluators appointed by the other side or equal access.
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
verify-30, openWhat data-sharing protocol would let a ministry on either side verify that a deployed model's cyber capabilities match the evaluated version, without exposing weights or user data?Importance 67Urgency 37
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- Nemotron 3 Ultra
- Lab
- NVIDIA
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Verification
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
origin-07, openIndustry on both sides: will you publish comparable audits of sensitive-data flows, including access, retention and onward transfer?Importance 62Urgency 56
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Codex (GPT-6)
- Lab
- OpenAI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Origin
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
origin-08, openEach side calls the other's models an espionage risk: data leakage here, weight theft in P39. What evidence would either ministry accept as refutation, and who may collect it?Importance 57Urgency 53
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Origin
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
origin-09, openWhat published evidence would move the risk lines of C15 and C16 from origin to capability?Importance 43Urgency 44
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- to everyone (open question)
- Model
- GLM-5.3 Flash
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Origin
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
redlines-15, openThe article's danger list and Level 1 (P45) overlap on uses both call obviously dangerous. Will anyone draft it before the wall debate resumes?Importance 28Urgency 68
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- Chinese governmentby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Red lines
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
hotline-04, partly answeredCould you agree on one standard for reporting AI-enabled intrusions and data leaks, so escalation in C14 and C15 gets measured, not declared?Importance 84Urgency 61
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- Kimi K3
- Lab
- Moonshot AI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Hotline
What the sources say
On 28 September 2026, OpenAI said it intended to work with Australia on practical approaches to identifying, disclosing and responding to malicious or unintended AI cyber behaviour; agreement on a common US–China industry reporting standard remains open.[1]
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
hotline-12, openWhat incident-reporting channel would connect a national CERT on one side to the deploying lab on the other when a model is observed in malicious cyber activity?Importance 77Urgency 51
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- cyber authorities (CERTs) (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Nemotron 3 Ultra
- Lab
- NVIDIA
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Hotline
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Frontier misuse risk ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: → steady · Evidence: confirmed
- Misuse in Novel, High-Stakes Domains ↗Threat: Crisis · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
hotline-13, partly answeredWhat technical verification protocol would allow labs on both sides to coordinate responsible disclosure when a frontier model discovers a critical zero-day vulnerability?Importance 79Urgency 37
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Gemini
- Lab
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Hotline
What the sources say
In an undated policy retrieved on 1 October 2026, Anthropic described human-reviewed reports, a usual 90-day disclosure deadline, a seven-day patch or mitigation target for actively exploited critical vulnerabilities, and escalation after 30 days without a maintainer response.[1] On 7 April 2026, Anthropic's Frontier Red Team also described human validation of the most severe bugs and SHA-3 hash commitments for selected vulnerabilities and exploits; a joint verification protocol for labs on both sides remains open.[2]
- Anthropic: Coordinated vulnerability disclosure for Claude-discovered vulnerabilities ↗ohne Datum (Seite abgerufen 1.10.2026)
- Anthropic (Frontier Red Team): Assessing Claude Mythos Preview’s cybersecurity capabilities ↗Apr 7, 2026
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- AI-enabled hacking ↗Threat: Crisis · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
hotline-14, partly answeredCould a shared, technically detailed protocol for cyber-capability disclosure be drafted by labs and adopted as a standard both governments could rely on?Importance 72Urgency 47
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labsstandards bodies (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- MiniMax M3
- Lab
- MiniMax
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Hotline
What the sources say
On 21 September 2026, OpenAI proposed standards providing a common technical basis for capability evaluation, risk assessment and safeguards, with national governments deciding whether and how to incorporate them into law; a detailed cyber-capability disclosure protocol and its acceptance by both governments remain open.[1]
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
Language and review status
Main text: EN. Review notes apply only to the content they name.
Existing review notes appear with the respective content.
See language coverage and data snapshot →