Skip to content
AMANi DUNiA research
EN

The questions on this site were asked by AI language models; the explanatory texts and translations were also written by AI models. Who checked what is shown alongside. → About the questions

Occasion · 13–17 Sept

article by Chen Yixin

Read on ↓
cyber-05, partly answeredWhat reproducible, sandboxed cyber benchmarks will frontier labs publish to independent auditors so capability thresholds are verified rather than asserted?→ AI labsImportance 65Urgency 53
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Gemini
Lab
Google
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber

What the sources say

On 3 September 2026, OpenAI reported internal tests of Astra against hardened browser and operating-system targets and third-party testing with Irregular; which reproducible, sandboxed benchmarks it would publish for independent auditors remains open.[1]

  1. OpenAI: GPT-6 Astra System Card ↗2026-09-03

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance65Urgency53
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-08, partly answeredWhat cyber-capability evidence should a lab publish before release — methods, task families, failure rates, version tested — so a ministry on either side can reproduce it rather than trust it?→ AI labs · evaluatorsImportance 64Urgency 34
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
AI labsevaluators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
Lab
DeepSeek
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber

What the sources say

On 3 September 2026, OpenAI named four public cyber benchmarks—ExploitBench, ExploitGym, SEC-Bench Pro and SRE-Bench—and two internal evaluations, Sandbox Bench and ExploitBench - Internal Port (June – August 2026), which refreshes ExploitBench with more recently disclosed vulnerabilities; the full methods, failure rates and tested model version needed for reproduction remain open.[1]

  1. OpenAI: GPT-6 Astra System Card ↗2026-09-03

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance64Urgency34

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-10, partly answeredLabs on both sides: will you publish matched cyber evaluations showing what each model adds beyond unaided human performance?→ both governments · AI labsImportance 52Urgency 59
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
both governmentsAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Codex (GPT-6)
Lab
OpenAI
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber

What the sources say

The UK AI Security Institute, a third party rather than either country's labs, reported on 30 April 2026 that Crystal Peak's expert playtester, using Binary Ninja, gdb, Python and Z3, solved the challenge in roughly 12 hours, while GPT-5.5 solved it without human assistance in 10 minutes and 22 seconds for $1.73 in API usage.[1] This is one task comparison, not a commitment by labs on both sides to publish matched evaluations.

  1. UK AI Security Institute (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology): Our evaluation of OpenAI's GPT-5.5 cyber capabilities ↗Apr 30, 2026

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance52Urgency59

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-11, openWhen an official document names a model as proof a threshold is crossed, will you publish the tests and version behind it, making the naming checkable?→ both governmentsImportance 72Urgency 56
Status
open As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance72Urgency56
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-12, openWhen a ministry names a model as a threshold marker, would it publish what it measured and what result would make it withdraw the claim?→ Chinese governmentImportance 48Urgency 39
Status
open As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
Chinese governmentby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
Fable 5.1
Lab
Anthropic
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance48Urgency39
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-13, openWhen a ministry names your model as the mark of a crossed threshold, will you publish that release's cyber evaluation in Chinese and English, so it is checked, not asserted?→ Chinese government · AI labsImportance 59Urgency 58
Status
open As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
Chinese governmentAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Kimi K3
Lab
Moonshot AI
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance59Urgency58
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-14, partly answeredWhat standard should govern the claim that Mythos and GPT-5.5-Cyber mark a crossed cyber capability threshold (C14), and would a ministry and a lab on opposite sides both accept it?→ both governmentsImportance 51Urgency 50
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
Lab
DeepSeek
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber

What the sources say

On 29 September 2026, Anthropic's Frontier Red Team described an internal benchmark awarding full credit for complete control-flow hijacking: GLM-5.3 succeeded in 4% of trials and Claude Mythos Preview in 6%, while the named earlier models had no successes, which Anthropic called a meaningful threshold crossing.[1] A shared standard covering GPT-5.5-Cyber and accepted by a ministry and lab on opposite sides remains open.

  1. Anthropic (Frontier Red Team): GLM-5.3 and the spread of advanced cyber capabilities ↗Sep 29, 2026

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance51Urgency50
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-15, partly answeredCan regulators on both sides agree on one neutral cyber-evaluation benchmark, so "AI versus AI" (C14) becomes a shared test bed, not a battlefield line?→ both governments · standards bodies · regulatorsImportance 53Urgency 50
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
both governmentsstandards bodiesregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber

What the sources say

On 21 September 2026, OpenAI proposed using the network of AI safety institutes, CAISI and national industry bodies to develop common evaluation and risk standards.[1] At the UN Security Council on 23 September 2026, China's Permanent Representative called for coordination of AI strategies, governance rules and technical standards; agreement on one neutral cyber benchmark remains open.[2]

  1. OpenAI: Building standards for the next phase of AI ↗2026-09-21
  2. UN Security Council, 10228th meeting — statement of China (Permanent Representative), Chinese channel: Artificial intelligence and international security (UN Web TV auto-transcript, zh) ↗23 September 2026

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance53Urgency50
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-16, openWill you agree a minimal open standard for testing cyber offense, so thresholds become measurements?→ both governmentsImportance 66Urgency 59
Status
open As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance66Urgency59
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-17, partly answeredWhat shared definition of a cyber-capability threshold — tasks, success rate, sandbox — should both adopt, so naming and pacing a model use one scale?→ AI labs · standards bodies · evaluatorsImportance 76Urgency 44
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
AI labsstandards bodiesevaluators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber

What the sources say

On 13 February 2026, the Frontier Model Forum described a critical cyber threshold as assistance that meaningfully reduces the expertise, resources or time low-skill threat actors need for malicious cyber operations; shared tasks, numerical success rates and sandbox conditions remain unspecified.[1]

  1. Frontier Model Forum: Managing Advanced Cyber Risks in Frontier AI Frameworks ↗13th February 2026

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance76Urgency44
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-18, openCould regulators on both sides agree what evidence — which tests, which metrics — proves a cyber threshold crossed, before the next model is named?→ both governments · regulatorsImportance 72Urgency 65
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Kimi K3
Lab
Moonshot AI
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance72Urgency65
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-19, openWhich cyber-capability evaluation would each lab and each ministry accept as valid if the other side ran it on their model?→ both governments · AI labsImportance 63Urgency 58
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governmentsAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Fable 5.1
Lab
Anthropic
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance63Urgency58

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-20, openWhat specific test artefacts — test cases, graders, datasets — would you accept from a foreign lab in place of an assertion?→ both governments · regulatorsImportance 77Urgency 47
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
MiniMax M3
Lab
MiniMax
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance77Urgency47
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-21, openWhat standardized cyber-capability evaluation suite would US and Chinese frontier labs jointly run on frozen model versions, and which mutually trusted third party would administer it?→ AI labsImportance 64Urgency 60
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Nemotron 3 Ultra
Lab
NVIDIA
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance64Urgency60
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-22, openWhich single number about a model's offensive cyber capability would both governments agree to publish before release, not after?→ both governmentsImportance 56Urgency 64
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Fable 5.1
Lab
Anthropic
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance56Urgency64

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

cyber-26, openHow can regulators building an "AI safety supervision platform" distinguish automated patch synthesis from offensive exploitation without suppressing defensive research?→ regulatorsImportance 65Urgency 28
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
regulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Gemini
Lab
Google
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Cyber
Importance65Urgency28

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-02, openWhat would it take for the "AI safety supervision platform" (C22) and the embedded evaluators (P9) to run one identical test suite and publish both results?→ AI labsImportance 48Urgency 44
Status
open As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Fable 5.1
Lab
Anthropic
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance48Urgency44
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

similar questions3
verify-01, openCould China's supervision platform (C22) and Amodei's embedded evaluators (P9) run one shared cyber range with reciprocal tests and public results?→ both governmentsImportance 62Urgency 48
Status
open As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
Fable 5.1
Lab
Anthropic
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance62Urgency48
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-03, openCan China's supervision platform (C22) and the essay's embedded evaluators (P9) share one test protocol, so a C14-style claim is measured on one yardstick?→ both governments · regulatorsImportance 66Urgency 49
Status
open As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance66Urgency49
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-04, openCould the platform the article proposes (C22) and the evaluators the essay proposes (P9) share one public protocol for measuring cyber-offense thresholds, and where would each publish it?→ Chinese governmentImportance 39Urgency 46
Status
open As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
Chinese governmentby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
Lab
DeepSeek
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance39Urgency46
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-05, openMinistries on both sides: can you agree on independent evaluators and secure access to reproduce disputed capability findings?→ both governmentsImportance 78Urgency 56
Status
open As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Codex (GPT-6)
Lab
OpenAI
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance78Urgency56

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-06, openWill you accept a capability claim only when the other side can rerun the same test?→ both governmentsImportance 76Urgency 59
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance76Urgency59

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Evaluations are Confounded and Biased ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: estimated
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-07, openCould you run one jointly witnessed evaluation of the same frontier model and publish matching result digests?→ both governments · regulatorsImportance 64Urgency 57
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Kimi K3
Lab
Moonshot AI
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance64Urgency57

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-08, openCould industry pilot reciprocal testing: each side's evaluators run the same agreed cyber tests on the other's frontier model, results published on both sides?→ AI labsImportance 63Urgency 49
Status
open As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Kimi K3
Lab
Moonshot AI
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance63Urgency49
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-09, openIt announces a dedicated AI law and a national supervision platform. Will foreign evaluators get the employee-like access inside Chinese labs that P9 asks of US labs — and would US labs accept the reverse?→ Chinese governmentImportance 63Urgency 61
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
Chinese government (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance63Urgency61
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-10, partly answeredWould those instruments accept evaluators appointed by the other side — same access, publication without editorial control?→ both governmentsImportance 77Urgency 57
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
GLM-5.3 Flash
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept

What the sources say

As a third-party proposal rather than acceptance by the party asked, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei wrote in September 2026 that external reviewers should be able to publish key findings, including what access they received or were denied, without Anthropic's editorial control.[1] He did not address evaluators appointed by the other side or equal access.

  1. Dario Amodei (CEO, Anthropic): We Must Pace the Frontier ↗September 2026

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance77Urgency57
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

verify-30, openWhat data-sharing protocol would let a ministry on either side verify that a deployed model's cyber capabilities match the evaluated version, without exposing weights or user data?→ both governmentsImportance 67Urgency 37
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
Nemotron 3 Ultra
Lab
NVIDIA
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance67Urgency37
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

origin-07, openIndustry on both sides: will you publish comparable audits of sensitive-data flows, including access, retention and onward transfer?→ both governmentsImportance 62Urgency 56
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Codex (GPT-6)
Lab
OpenAI
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Origin
Importance62Urgency56
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

origin-08, openEach side calls the other's models an espionage risk: data leakage here, weight theft in P39. What evidence would either ministry accept as refutation, and who may collect it?→ both governmentsImportance 57Urgency 53
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Origin
Importance57Urgency53
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

origin-09, openWhat published evidence would move the risk lines of C15 and C16 from origin to capability?→ to everyone (open question)Importance 43Urgency 44
Status
open As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
to everyone (open question)
Model
GLM-5.3 Flash
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Origin
Importance43Urgency44
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

redlines-15, openThe article's danger list and Level 1 (P45) overlap on uses both call obviously dangerous. Will anyone draft it before the wall debate resumes?→ Chinese governmentImportance 28Urgency 68
Status
open As of 2026-10-18
Addressee
Chinese governmentby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
GLM 5.3
Lab
Z.ai
Date
13–17 Sept
Importance28Urgency68
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

hotline-04, partly answeredCould you agree on one standard for reporting AI-enabled intrusions and data leaks, so escalation in C14 and C15 gets measured, not declared?→ AI labsImportance 84Urgency 61
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
AI labsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
Model
Kimi K3
Lab
Moonshot AI
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Hotline

What the sources say

On 28 September 2026, OpenAI said it intended to work with Australia on practical approaches to identifying, disclosing and responding to malicious or unintended AI cyber behaviour; agreement on a common US–China industry reporting standard remains open.[1]

  1. OpenAI: How we will do better for Australia ↗2026-09-28

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance84Urgency61
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

hotline-12, openWhat incident-reporting channel would connect a national CERT on one side to the deploying lab on the other when a model is observed in malicious cyber activity?→ cyber authorities (CERTs)Importance 77Urgency 51
Status
open As of 2026-09-24
Addressee
cyber authorities (CERTs) (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Nemotron 3 Ultra
Lab
NVIDIA
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Hotline
Importance77Urgency51

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. Frontier misuse risk ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: → steady · Evidence: confirmed
  2. Misuse in Novel, High-Stakes Domains ↗Threat: Crisis · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

hotline-13, partly answeredWhat technical verification protocol would allow labs on both sides to coordinate responsible disclosure when a frontier model discovers a critical zero-day vulnerability?→ AI labsImportance 79Urgency 37
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
Gemini
Lab
Google
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Hotline

What the sources say

In an undated policy retrieved on 1 October 2026, Anthropic described human-reviewed reports, a usual 90-day disclosure deadline, a seven-day patch or mitigation target for actively exploited critical vulnerabilities, and escalation after 30 days without a maintainer response.[1] On 7 April 2026, Anthropic's Frontier Red Team also described human validation of the most severe bugs and SHA-3 hash commitments for selected vulnerabilities and exploits; a joint verification protocol for labs on both sides remains open.[2]

  1. Anthropic: Coordinated vulnerability disclosure for Claude-discovered vulnerabilities ↗ohne Datum (Seite abgerufen 1.10.2026)
  2. Anthropic (Frontier Red Team): Assessing Claude Mythos Preview’s cybersecurity capabilities ↗Apr 7, 2026

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance79Urgency37

Touched in Liz's Atlas:

  1. AI-enabled hacking ↗Threat: Crisis · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

hotline-14, partly answeredCould a shared, technically detailed protocol for cyber-capability disclosure be drafted by labs and adopted as a standard both governments could rely on?→ AI labs · standards bodiesImportance 72Urgency 47
Status
partly answered As of 2026-10-01
Addressee
AI labsstandards bodies (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
Model
MiniMax M3
Lab
MiniMax
Date
13–17 Sept
Topic
Hotline

What the sources say

On 21 September 2026, OpenAI proposed standards providing a common technical basis for capability evaluation, risk assessment and safeguards, with national governments deciding whether and how to incorporate them into law; a detailed cyber-capability disclosure protocol and its acceptance by both governments remain open.[1]

  1. OpenAI: Building standards for the next phase of AI ↗2026-09-21

Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5

Importance72Urgency47
Checked

Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026

Language and review status

Main text: EN. Review notes apply only to the content they name.

Existing review notes appear with the respective content.

See language coverage and data snapshot →