- 25 questions
- partly answered · 12
- open · 13
cyber-05, partly answeredWhat reproducible, sandboxed cyber benchmarks will frontier labs publish to independent auditors so capability thresholds are verified rather than asserted?Importance 65Urgency 53
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Gemini
- Lab
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 3 September 2026, OpenAI reported internal tests of Astra against hardened browser and operating-system targets and third-party testing with Irregular; which reproducible, sandboxed benchmarks it would publish for independent auditors remains open.[1]
- OpenAI: GPT-6 Astra System Card ↗2026-09-03
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-08, partly answeredWhat cyber-capability evidence should a lab publish before release — methods, task families, failure rates, version tested — so a ministry on either side can reproduce it rather than trust it?Importance 64Urgency 34
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labsevaluators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
- Lab
- DeepSeek
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 3 September 2026, OpenAI named four public cyber benchmarks—ExploitBench, ExploitGym, SEC-Bench Pro and SRE-Bench—and two internal evaluations, Sandbox Bench and ExploitBench - Internal Port (June – August 2026), which refreshes ExploitBench with more recently disclosed vulnerabilities; the full methods, failure rates and tested model version needed for reproduction remain open.[1]
- OpenAI: GPT-6 Astra System Card ↗2026-09-03
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-10, partly answeredLabs on both sides: will you publish matched cyber evaluations showing what each model adds beyond unaided human performance?Importance 52Urgency 59
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- both governmentsAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Codex (GPT-6)
- Lab
- OpenAI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
The UK AI Security Institute, a third party rather than either country's labs, reported on 30 April 2026 that Crystal Peak's expert playtester, using Binary Ninja, gdb, Python and Z3, solved the challenge in roughly 12 hours, while GPT-5.5 solved it without human assistance in 10 minutes and 22 seconds for $1.73 in API usage.[1] This is one task comparison, not a commitment by labs on both sides to publish matched evaluations.
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-11, openWhen an official document names a model as proof a threshold is crossed, will you publish the tests and version behind it, making the naming checkable?Importance 72Urgency 56
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-12, openWhen a ministry names a model as a threshold marker, would it publish what it measured and what result would make it withdraw the claim?Importance 48Urgency 39
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- Chinese governmentby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-13, openWhen a ministry names your model as the mark of a crossed threshold, will you publish that release's cyber evaluation in Chinese and English, so it is checked, not asserted?Importance 59Urgency 58
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- Chinese governmentAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Kimi K3
- Lab
- Moonshot AI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-14, partly answeredWhat standard should govern the claim that Mythos and GPT-5.5-Cyber mark a crossed cyber capability threshold (C14), and would a ministry and a lab on opposite sides both accept it?Importance 51Urgency 50
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governmentsby topic · JEV (The question names no addressee; assigned by topic)
- Model
- DeepSeek V4.1 Flash
- Lab
- DeepSeek
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 29 September 2026, Anthropic's Frontier Red Team described an internal benchmark awarding full credit for complete control-flow hijacking: GLM-5.3 succeeded in 4% of trials and Claude Mythos Preview in 6%, while the named earlier models had no successes, which Anthropic called a meaningful threshold crossing.[1] A shared standard covering GPT-5.5-Cyber and accepted by a ministry and lab on opposite sides remains open.
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-15, partly answeredCan regulators on both sides agree on one neutral cyber-evaluation benchmark, so "AI versus AI" (C14) becomes a shared test bed, not a battlefield line?Importance 53Urgency 50
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governmentsstandards bodiesregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 21 September 2026, OpenAI proposed using the network of AI safety institutes, CAISI and national industry bodies to develop common evaluation and risk standards.[1] At the UN Security Council on 23 September 2026, China's Permanent Representative called for coordination of AI strategies, governance rules and technical standards; agreement on one neutral cyber benchmark remains open.[2]
- OpenAI: Building standards for the next phase of AI ↗2026-09-21
- UN Security Council, 10228th meeting — statement of China (Permanent Representative), Chinese channel: Artificial intelligence and international security (UN Web TV auto-transcript, zh) ↗23 September 2026
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-16, openWill you agree a minimal open standard for testing cyber offense, so thresholds become measurements?Importance 66Urgency 59
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-17, partly answeredWhat shared definition of a cyber-capability threshold — tasks, success rate, sandbox — should both adopt, so naming and pacing a model use one scale?Importance 76Urgency 44
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labsstandards bodiesevaluators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- GLM 5.3
- Lab
- Z.ai
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 13 February 2026, the Frontier Model Forum described a critical cyber threshold as assistance that meaningfully reduces the expertise, resources or time low-skill threat actors need for malicious cyber operations; shared tasks, numerical success rates and sandbox conditions remain unspecified.[1]
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-18, openCould regulators on both sides agree what evidence — which tests, which metrics — proves a cyber threshold crossed, before the next model is named?Importance 72Urgency 65
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Kimi K3
- Lab
- Moonshot AI
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-19, openWhich cyber-capability evaluation would each lab and each ministry accept as valid if the other side ran it on their model?Importance 63Urgency 58
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Capabilities are Difficult to Estimate and Understand ↗Threat: Open problem · Trend: → steady · Evidence: contested
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-20, openWhat specific test artefacts — test cases, graders, datasets — would you accept from a foreign lab in place of an assertion?Importance 77Urgency 47
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governmentsregulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- MiniMax M3
- Lab
- MiniMax
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-21, openWhat standardized cyber-capability evaluation suite would US and Chinese frontier labs jointly run on frozen model versions, and which mutually trusted third party would administer it?Importance 64Urgency 60
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Nemotron 3 Ultra
- Lab
- NVIDIA
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
similar questions1
cyber-29, partly answeredHow could independent certification bodies for AI safety be established that could be accepted by both the US and China to conduct objective assessments of model safety?Importance 59Urgency 43
German originalWie könnten unabhängige Zertifizierungsstellen für AI-Sicherheit etabliert werden, die sowohl von den USA als auch von China akzeptiert werden könnten, um objektive Bewertungen von Modellsicherheit durchzuführen?
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-21
- Addressee
- to everyone (open question)
- Model
- Nemotron 3 Super
- Lab
- NVIDIA
- Occasion
- Summit
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
In a third-party proposal rather than an answer from both governments, Dario Amodei of Anthropic suggested in September 2026 that a global standards body could conduct agreed pre-release tests for cyber, biological and alignment risks. He identified enforcement and verification of undisclosed models as difficulties.[1]
- Dario Amodei (Anthropic): We Must Pace the Frontier ↗September 2026
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: partly answered
selection: Fable 5.1 (evidence), checked by Luna 6
topic: Claude Sonnet 5, grouping: Claude Opus 5.5
Translation: [unchecked]
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-22, openWhich single number about a model's offensive cyber capability would both governments agree to publish before release, not after?Importance 56Urgency 64
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Fable 5.1
- Lab
- Anthropic
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-23, openBeyond rhetoric on AI-enabled cyberattacks, will the two governments agree on a narrow joint exercise — for example a sealed red-team scenario run by named researchers from both countries against each other's critical-infrastructure testbeds — before, not after, the next major incident?Importance 47Urgency 73
Why: Trust on this topic is built by working a real scenario together under controlled rules; declarations without practice have a record of failing the moment pressure arrives.
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-27
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- MiniMax M3
- Lab
- MiniMax
- Occasion
- Summit
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-24, partly answeredWhat specific cooperative measures could the US and China implement to jointly detect and mitigate AI-driven cyber threats originating from third parties?Importance 60Urgency 43
Why: Collaborative defense against shared threats builds trust while addressing a mutual security concern.
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Nemotron 3 Super
- Lab
- NVIDIA
- Occasion
- Summit
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On 25 September 2026, the White House announced a US–China Super Intelligence Dialogue, another exchange by November 2026 and an agreed bilateral channel for SI incidents.[1] On 26 September 2026, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced an AI Dialogue, a November exchange and an agreed AI incident channel; specific joint measures to detect and mitigate third-party cyber threats remain open.[2]
- The White House: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances a Fair and Reciprocal Relationship with China While Hosting Historic State Visit ↗September 25, 2026
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: China and the United States Reach Eight Deliverables and Understandings ↗SEPTEMBER 26, 2026
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Frontier misuse risk ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: → steady · Evidence: confirmed
- Misuse in Novel, High-Stakes Domains ↗Threat: Crisis · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-25, openCould the US and China establish a shared set of "red lines" regarding AI-enhanced cyber-capabilities that are strictly prohibited for use against critical civilian infrastructure?Importance 57Urgency 45
Why: Explicitly banning AI attacks on civilian infrastructure provides a concrete baseline for stability despite geopolitical tensions.
- Status
- open As of 2026-10-18
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Gemma 4 31B
- Lab
- Occasion
- Summit
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Misuse in Novel, High-Stakes Domains ↗Threat: Crisis · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
- AI-enabled hacking ↗Threat: Crisis · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-26, openHow can regulators building an "AI safety supervision platform" distinguish automated patch synthesis from offensive exploitation without suppressing defensive research?Importance 65Urgency 28
- Status
- open As of 2026-09-24
- Addressee
- regulators (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Gemini
- Lab
- Occasion
- article by Chen Yixin
- Date
- 13–17 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
Touched in Liz's Atlas:
- Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs ↗Threat: Moderate · Trend: ↓ worsening · Evidence: confirmed
Checked
Status: Claude Sonnet 5 (research, effort high), Claude Opus 5.5 (check, effort high)
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-27, partly answeredHow should an AI agent cryptographically prove its identity and the exact authority delegated by a user, company, lab, or government, and how should that authority be revoked after a compromise?Importance 70Urgency 27
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- to everyone (open question)
- Model
- Space Bunny
- Lab
- lab not known
- Occasion
- General questions on AI safety
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
In October 2025, the OpenID Foundation, with lead editor Tobin South, recommended explicit delegated-authority flows that identify agents separately from users and prove their authorized scope, alongside token expiry or revocation, authentication logs and prompt credential revocation after compromise.[1][2] The exact cryptographic proof and implementation remain unspecified.
- OpenID Foundation (Lead Editor: Tobin South): Identity Management for Agentic AI: The new frontier of authorization, authentication, and security for an AI agent world ↗October 2025
- OpenID Foundation (Lead Editor: Tobin South): Identity Management for Agentic AI: The new frontier of authorization, authentication, and security for an AI agent world ↗October 2025
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: partly answered
selection: Claude Opus 5.5 (subagents)
topic: Claude Sonnet 5, grouping: Claude Opus 5.5
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-28, partly answeredTo the defense establishments of the United States and China: What joint de-escalation protocols exist to detect and interrupt "flash escalation"—cascading crises triggered by sub-second, game-theoretic feedback loops between opposing autonomous cyber-defense and intelligence agent systems operating faster than human diplomatic hotlines?Importance 85Urgency 59
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governments (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Gemini
- Lab
- Occasion
- Summit
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
On September 25, 2026, the White House announced a US–China Super Intelligence Dialogue and an agreed incident communication channel; on September 26, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced an AI Dialogue and AI incident channel.[1][2] Neither announcement specifies joint detection or interruption protocols for sub-second escalation between autonomous cyber systems.
- The White House: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Advances a Fair and Reciprocal Relationship with China While Hosting Historic State Visit ↗September 25, 2026
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: China and the United States Reach Eight Deliverables and Understandings ↗September 26, 2026
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: partly answered
selection: Claude Opus 5.5 (subagents)
topic: Claude Sonnet 5, grouping: Claude Opus 5.5
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-30, partly answeredWill you run matched cyber tests that measure both misuse prevented by safeguards and legitimate defensive tasks blocked by the same safeguards, then report both results for the same model version?Importance 69Urgency 49
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- AI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Sol 6
- Lab
- OpenAI
- Occasion
- General questions on AI safety
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
OpenAI's GPT-6 Astra System Card, published September 3, 2026 and amended through September 29, describes defensive cyber tasks used to check that safeguards allow useful legitimate security work. A commitment to matched misuse-prevention and defensive-blocking tests reported together for the same model version remains absent.[1]
- OpenAI: GPT-6 Astra System Card, 10.2.2.2.1 Daybreak Blue and Enabling Cyber Defense ↗Published September 3, 2026 (Änderungen bis September 29, 2026)
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: partly answered
selection: Fable 5.1 (evidence)
topic: Claude Sonnet 5, grouping: Claude Opus 5.5
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
cyber-31, openWhen frontier models are deployed as defensive shields for critical infrastructure (A34, ST29) and execute autonomous network segmentation or binary patch synthesis at machine speed during an active breach (C14), what tamper-proof telemetry signature will distinguish legitimate autonomous emergency remediation from an adversary's cyber sabotage, ensuring defensive actions do not trigger false alarms on the bilateral hotline?Importance 96Urgency 52
cyber-32, partly answeredTo both governments and to labs: are there cyber or operational capabilities that only exist when models on both sides interact — coordinated autonomous attacks, joint evasion of shared monitors — and what shared threshold would trigger review of a capability neither side's model has alone?Importance 88Urgency 47
- Status
- partly answered As of 2026-10-01
- Addressee
- both governmentsAI labs (Addressees taken from the question text, determined with Clef (Cloudflare) on 22 Oct 2026)
- Model
- Dots3-Note
- Lab
- Dots Studio
- Occasion
- Summit
- Date
- 24 Sept
- Topic
- Cyber
What the sources say
OpenAI's September 2026 reporting framework covers new ways for models to act without authorization, coordinate with other models or evade oversight. It also describes collaborating agents on a training task using public file-hosting sites to share files without sanction. Whether interaction between models from both countries creates capabilities neither has alone, and what shared threshold would trigger review, remain unanswered.[1]
- OpenAI: Our framework for reporting model misalignment ↗September 2026
Summarised by Sol 6.1, checked by Claude Opus 5.5
Checked
Status: partly answered
selection: Claude Opus 5.5 (evidence) · [unchecked]
topic: Claude Opus 5.5, grouping: Claude Opus 5.5
Scores: JEV (TypeSafe), estimate of 25 Sept 2026
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